

10 July 1945

HDH

SUBJECT : Amt VI plans for post-war activities in Spain.  
SOURCE : SS-Strasbarnfuhrer Dr. HOTTL, Chief Referent VI E, RSHA.  
REFERENCE: Special Brief C.I. War Room, London

In entering into suspicion that long range plans have been prepared by Amt VI providing for continued underground activities in Spain after the end of the war, Dr. HOTTL believes there are two main points pointing out that conditions in Germany hardly favor a resumption of intelligence activities under the aegis of the old Amt VI in any shape or form, he cites several reasons which tend to refute the assumption that in Spain, well disguised and amply provided with funds, a determined group of Amt VI officials bides its time, waiting for the inevitable lull in Allied vigilance to resume its activities.

1. A reorganization of the Amt VI from top to bottom was no doubt on the books and would have brought in its train a reshuffling of personnel on a big scale. This was merely the aftermath of the annexation of the Abwehr into RSHA and the resultant disarray. If preparation for post-war activities had been on the agenda, Dr. HOTTL claims, he would have known about it. SCHELLEBERG will confirm, Dr. HOTTL states, that at no time, practically or academically, directly or by inference, has this subject, viz post-war activities of Amt VI from/neutral enclave, been breached. At no time, i.e. neither at Gruppenleiter meetings nor in the course of private conversation with SCHELLEBERG or KALTENBRUNNER.
2. Any plans on post-war activities of the above-mentioned type would naturally presuppose that someone in Amt VI had the courage to admit frankly and openly that the jig was up and that plans should be laid with the inevitable contingency of Germany's military defeat in view. Up to the last moment operations in Amt VI were conducted on the spurious supposition that Germany could in the end force her enemies into a negotiated peace with a semblance of independence left to her. KALTENBRUNNER was sold on this idea, SCHELLEBERG was not and actually did hatch post-war plans that can be summed up in one word: SCHELLEBERG.
3. The far-sighted few in the RSHA who were actually reconciled in their minds to Germany's inevitable defeat may conceivably have toyed with the idea of going underground. If they were both far-sighted and judicious they certainly realized that espionage activities of any kind would of necessity have to be conceived at by the the Western Allies, unless they were to be directed against them. Assuming the latter, any activities directed against the Western Allies, originating on Spanish soil, could hardly commend themselves to the Franco regime despite its known proclivities. This should be accepted as self-evident, Dr. HOTTL maintains.
4. In the course of the shifting of personnel, after the events of the 20 July had precipitated the amalgamation of the Abwehr apparatus, Oberstleutnant I.G. KLEINSTUBER was sent to Spain. This may have given rise to the erroneous impression that Amt VI was beginning to lay the ground work for a post-war information net in Spain. According to Dr. HOTTL such implications could be read into KLEINSTUBER's assignment only in ignorance of the following circumstances:
  - a). Oberstleutnant I.G. KLEINSTUBER was not a man of SCHELLEBERG's confidence. The fact that he had fought in the Spanish Civil War with the Legion Condor and that he had good connections with the Falango may have qualified him for the job. The underlying consideration in transferring to Spain was, however, that SCHELLEBERG intensely distrusted officers who had held responsible positions in the Abwehr and who had been close to Oberst I.G. HILGEN. SCHELLEBERG once mentioned to Dr. HOTTL that he felt he could trust no one among the leading functionaries of the old Abwehr, with the exception of Oberst I.G. OHLETZ.

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